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3.1  Introduction 
That there was a rapid increase in Brazil’s exports from the mid-1960s 
onward may be seen from table 3.1. Total exports,  which were $1.4 
billion  in  1955, were  only  marginally  above that level  in  1965, and 
manufactured exports constituted only 16 percent of total exports. By 
contrast, export growth “took off” over the following decade. By 1975, 
total export earnings were $7.9 billion, almost five times their 1965 level, 
and manufactured exports had risen sharply to $2.4 billion, increasing at 
an average annual rate of 33.4 percent. Not only manufactured exports, 
but many natural resource  based  (NRB) commodities  shared in  the 
export boom,’ while earnings from traditional exports, notably coffee, 
grew only slowly. 
In analyzing the trade strategy-employment  relationship, the Brazil 
study in this project  took as a given  the rapid  expansion  of  Brazil’s 
exports in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Carvalho and Haddad 1978). It 
is the purpose of  this chapter to analyze the degree to which that boom 
was a function of the policy changes undertaken in the late 1960s. The 
export promotion strategy began haltingly in 1965,  and it gained momen- 
tum over the next several years. By 1968, incentives for exporting had 
been raised  significantly.  The strategy was based on two main policy 
instruments:  fiscal incentives and the mini-devaluations.  The strategy 
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Table 3.1  Brazilian Exports, Broad Commodity Categories, 1955-74 
(F.o.b., Millions of  U.S. Dollars) 
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SOURCE:  Carvalho and Haddad 1978,  appendix table. 
"NRB = total exports minus coffee exports minus exports of  manufactures. 
received  additional  support  from  the  import  liberalization measures 
taken in 1966 and 1967 (Carvalho and Haddad 1978, chaps. 2,3,  and 4). 
In  this chapter we  present  and  discuss new  estimates of  Brazilian 
export supply functions, trying to measure the effect of  the main policy 
instruments, as well as the other exogenous variables, on export growth. 
Although there are some very good earlier analyses of  the impressive 
export performance,2  they cover a relatively short period. We therefore 
decided to estimate new regressions, for manufactures and noncoffee 
NRB  goods,  covering the period  1955-74.  First we  will  make some 
general comments regarding the estimation of  export supply functions, 
then we will analyze the independent variables included in the estimates. 
3.2  Some Aspects of the Estimation of  Export Supply Functions 
Specifying an export supply function poses some special problems, 
because the supply of exports is an excess supply, equal to the difference 
between the total domestic supply and the total domestic demand for the 
particular product. Hence the supply of  exports is affected by forces that 151  Brazilian Export Growth: Estimating the Supply Response, 1955-74 
influence both domestic supply and domestic demand. But in a general 
equilibrium framework, which is relevant once we estimate an aggregate 
supply function, forces that affect demand also affect supply, and con- 
versely.  Thus a  proper specification  of  an export supply  function is 
especially difficult, particularly for Brazil because of  data limitations. 
There is yet another problem involving the estimation itself.  If  the 
so-called small-country hypothesis is accepted, foreign prices would be 
exogenous, and the structural form of the model could be estimated by 
ordinary least squares. But then why should we include a proxy for the 
volume of world trade, like total world imports, in the estimates? When 
we do  so we are assuming, implicitly, that shifts in foreign demand affect 
Brazilian exports. But, given the small-country hypothesis, foreign de- 
mand would influence Brazilian exports only through the indirect effect 
upon world prices, which would theoretically  be captured by the real 
exchange rate or another price variable. So there would be no room to 
include the level of  world trade, given the assumption of  an infinitely 
elastic foreign demand. 
When included in the estimates, however, the level of  world imports 
always turns up highly significant. Furthermore, that is in accord with the 
feelings and statements  of most policymakers and businessmen in Brazil. 
On the other hand, to abandon the small-country hypothesis does not 
seem very sensible. Except for coffee, and in recent periods soybeans, it 
is very hard to see how Brazil could significantly influence the world 
prices of her other major NRB goods, not to mention manufactures. So 
how can we reconcile the empirical results and general intuition with the 
fact that Brazil is essentially a price taker in foreign markets? We do not 
have a definite answer to this question, but a possible explanation lies in 
terms of  short run versus long run. The idea is that in the short run foreign 
demand may  be relatively  price  inelastic  (in the very  short run  it is 
certainly vertical)  although it is perfectly elastic in the long run. This 
explanation, advanced by Harberger (1972), can be rationalized in two 
ways: first, by recognizing the existence of  transaction and information 
costs that delay the response of  foreign demand to changes in prices; 
second, by assuming that, though perfectly elastic in the long run, foreign 
demand would be subject to volume limitations. This would be the case if 
quotas were imposed abroad limiting the quantity of  Brazilian products 
imported. The quotas could be either institutional barriers, government 
contracts, or ad hoc, as, for instance, the reluctance of  importers to 
change drastically the share of  each of their foreign suppliers.’ In any of 
those cases, the expansion of world trade would have also an expansion- 
ary effect on Brazilian exports. 
Therefore the export supply functions that were estimated are taken as 
reduced forms of a model we do not attempt to specify fully. But some 
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realized signs of  the coefficients. The independent variables normally 
included in the estimates are discussed below. 
3.2.1  Real Exchange Rate 
The real exchange rate should incorporate the price effect on exports. 
For manufactures it is defined in two alternative ways: gross and net of 
subsidies to exports. The index of  fiscal incentives was obtained from 
Tyler (1976, p. 220). We also introduced separately the real exchange 
rate and the subsidy index. Normally we  should expect that the coef- 
ficients of the two variables would be similar to each other, since for the 
exporters an increase in the exchange rate should be the same as an 
equivalent increase in the subsidy rates. However, some factors may 
account for the difference in the coefficients: errors of  measurement in 
the subsidy index; or the fact that, since imported inputs are used in 
export activities, a 10  percent increase in the nominal subsidy may have a 
more powerful effect than a devaluation of 10 percent, and, on the other 
hand, the higher administrative costs and the discretionary effects associ- 
ated with the subsidies as compared with the devaluation. 
The real exchange rate for manufactures is here defined as the product 
of the nominal rate received by exporters and the wholesale price index in 
the United States divided by a similar index in Brazil. For NRB goods we 
will substitute, alternatively, an index of  dollar prices of  noncoffee ex- 
ports for the wholesale price index in the United States. Both rates are 
presented  in table 3.2. Since fiscal incentives were granted  only for 
manufactures, that variable was not included in the NRB equations. 
3.2.2  The Variation of  the Real Exchange Rate 
As we mention elsewhere (Carvalho and Haddad 1978, chap. 4), one 
of the deterrents to export expansion until 1968  was the high risk involved 
in export activities owing to infrequent massive devaluations, common to 
countries under fixed exchange rate regimes and subjected to high rates 
of inflation. Supplicy (1976) handled this problem by introducing in his 
equations the annual average of  absolute changes in the real exchange 
rate. Since what should matter is the relative and not the absolute risk, 
however,  we decided to use  instead  the coefficient of  variation  (the 
standard deviation divided by the average) of the monthly real exchange 
rates during the year. The coefficient of  variation of  the real average 
export exchange rate is presented in table 3.2. 
3.2.3  World Imports 
We have already commented upon the role played by this variable and 
the possible rationales for it. In the estimates, world imports are the total 
dollar amount (cif.)  of  imports of the United States, the United King- 
dom, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands deflated by 
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Table 3.2  Real Exchange Rate and Its Coefficient of Variation, 1955-74 
Real Exchange  Real Exchange  Coefficient of  Real Exchange 
Rate for  Rate Including  Variation  Rate for 
Manufactures"  Fiscal Incentivesb  of  Rate 1'  NRB Productsd 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1955  2,850  2,850  ,1074  3,236 
1956  3,398  3,398  ,1245  2,457 
1957  2,187  2,187  ,1299  2,359 
1958  3,315  3,315  ,1124  3,292 
1959  2,815  2,815  ,0761  2,668 
1960  2,600  2,600  .0761  2,613 
1961  2,647  2,647  ,0670  2,613 
1962  2,517  2,517  ,0867  1,982 
1963  2,122  2,122  ,0867  1,718 
1964  2,583  2,589  .1666  2,197 
1965  2,552  2,675  ,0588  2,063 
1966  2,190  2,426  ,0922  1,821 
1967  2,080  2,527  ,0458  1,850 
1968  2,216  2,852  ,0346  1,948 
1969  2,319  3,102  .0243  1,918 
1970  2,272  3,166  ,0187  1,864 
1971  2,224  3,458  ,0105  1,890 
1972  2,215  3,678  ,0076  1,971 
1973  2,241  3,720  ,0174  2,473 
1974  2.287  3.797  ,0403  2.732 
"Export exchange rate times the wholesale price index in the United States (IMF, Znterna- 
tional  Financial  Statistics) divided  by  the  wholesale  price  index  in Brazil  (column  12, 
Conjuntura Econdmica). 
bColumn 1 divided by the index of  fiscal incentives to exports of  manufactures computed by 
Tyler (1976, p. 220). See note 4. 
'Coefficients of  variation computed within each year from monthly observations of the real 
exchange rate of  column 1. 
Tomputed in the same way as rate 1, substituting the dollar price of noncoffee Brazilian 
exports (Conjuntura Econdmica) for the wholesale price index in the United States. Both 
indexes are equal to 100 in 1970, therefore rates 1, 2, and 4 are comparable. 
3.2.4  Domestic Income 
Since exports  are  the difference between domestic supply and domestic 
demand, they should be affected  by the growth in  domestic income. 
However, when the country grows, both domestic demand and domestic 
supply are shifted, and therefore the expected overall effect of growth on 
exports is ambiguous. The variable included in the estimates is an index 
of Brazilian gross domestic real output. 
3.2.5  Short-Run Changes in Income 
Besides being affected by the level of income, which enters the esti- 
mates as a scale factor, exports might be affected by short-run expansion 
or contraction in domestic output above or below its normal trend. This is 
the so-called capacity-utilization variable used in previous studies. The 154  Jose L. Carvalho/Claudio L. S. Haddad 
sign of the coefficient of  this variable is ambiguous, since it depends on 
whether the cause of  the disturbance originates on  the demand side or the 
supply side. The capacity variable used was computed as the ratio be- 
tween real output (with three alternative definitions) and its long-run 
geometric trend estimated by least squares. 
3.3  The New Estimates 
In table 3.3  we present our best estimates concerning exports  of  manu- 
factures and of  NRB goods other than coffee.  Alternative  (and less 
satisfactory) models are also presented in Carvalho and Haddad (1978). 
The estimates of manufactures yielded very good results. In equation 
(i) we separate  the real exchange rate from the fiscal incentives, although 
in equation (ii) they are combined in an “effective exchange rate.” We 
can see from equation (i) that the price elasticity due exclusively to the 
real exchange rate is about 1.2  and the elasticity of fiscal incentives is near 
0.6, or about half.4 Therefore, according  to our estimates,  a  simple 
devaluation would be more stimulative to exports of manufactures than 
the same percentage increase in fiscal incentives. Bureaucracy and redun- 
dancy  may  explain  that re~ult.~  In equation (ii)  the combined price 
elasticity is equal to one. The coefficients of  the real exchange rate are 
significantly different from zero at 1  percent significance in both equa- 
tions. 
The coefficient of variation of  the real exchange rate enters with  a 
negative sign, implying that the higher the exchange rate risk the lower 
would be the volume of  exports. Its coefficient is not, however, statisti- 
cally different from zero at 10 percent significance. 
As mentioned above, the world imports variable has also a positive and 
highly significant coefficient in both equations. Real GDP does not turn 
up significant, but if we estimate equation (ii) without the world imports 
variable the GDP coefficient  becomes equal to 2.26 with a t-value of 
11.50. That is, we need a scale factor in our model, and that role is played 
by either world imports or GDP.6  When both are included, however, the 
world imports variable captures most of the explanation of the variance 
of  manufacturing  exports, which  indicates that the overall growth in 
world trade is in fact an important variable explaining annual changes in 
Brazilian exports of manufactures. Finally, the capacity utilization vari- 
able appears with a negative coefficient,’ which indicates that, on aver- 
age, excess capacity  in  industry  favored increased  exports of  manu- 
factures .* 
As a test of  whether there was a “structural change” in the export 
supply function in the mid-l960s, we performed  a Chow test for the 
periods 1955-64 and 1965-74. The Fstatistic was 3.586 for the hypothesis 
that the two periods belong to the same structure, with a critical F  for 95 Table 3.3  Estimates of Export Supply Functions: Annual Data,  1955-74 
Independent Variables and t- Coefficients 
Deoendent Variable  Constant  LREX  LFIX  L(REX/FIX)  LREXl  CVREX  LGDP  LWM  CAPI  R2  F  DW 
Manufactures 
LMANEX (i)  -11.248  1.246  -0.580 
(5.87)  (3.37)  (-0.77) 
LMANEX (ii)  -  10.608 
(3.65) 
NRB noncoffee 
LNRBNC (iii)  -  5.031 
r -  7.73) 
1.050 
(3.65) 
-0.0002  -1.204  2.825  -0.576  0.998  179.1  1.58 
(- 1.21)  (- 1.44)  (3.93)  (-0.76) 
(-0.82)  (-1.04)  (4.22)  (-1.44) 
-0.oOOl  -0.756  2.292  -0.732  0.998  229.0  1.72 
0.258  -0.OOO1  0.345  0.753  0.974  140.0  2.05 
(2.011  (-1.10)  (0.76)  (2.22) 
NOTES: 










= exports of  manufactures in real dollars; deflator used: wholesale price index in the United States. 
= exports of noncoffee NRB goods in real dollars; deflator used: index of  dollar prices of  Brazilian noncoffee exports. 
= real exchange rate for manufactures; deflators used: wholesale price indexes in Brazil and United States. 
= index of  fiscal incentives,  equal to the inverse of  total incentives given to manufactures. 
= real exchange rate substituting the dollar prices of  Brazilian noncoffee exports for the wholesale price index in the United States. 
= coefficient of  variation of REX during the year; computed from monthly observations. 
= Brazilian gross domestic product in real terms (index). 
= imports of  the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, France, Netherlands, and Italy in real dollars; deflator used: wholesale 
= ratio of the industrial product index to its long-run trend. 
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percent confidence level of  3.64. The test therefore marginally accepts 
the hypothesis of no structural changes. 
These results enable one to attempt an estimate of  the extent to which 
changes in the real exchange rate contributed to the spectacular expan- 
sion of Brazilian exports. The average real exchange rate in the period 
1955-59  was 22.3 percent below its level in 1970-74,  as can be seen from 
table 3.2.  From the regression  results  in  table  3.3, the elasticity  of 
Brazilian exports with respect to the exchange rate is  estimated to be 
1.050. Combining these numbers  would imply that Brazil’s manufactured 
exports  might have been about 23 percent less than they were in the early 
1970s had the real exchange rate been kept at its level of  the 1950s. To be 
sure, it is inconceivable that other export promotion policies would have 
been pursued without an alteration in exchange rate policy, and it may be 
inappropriate to attempt to estimate the contribution of  one factor to 
export growth.  Nonetheless,  the results suggest  that the altered  real 
exchange  rate was  an important factor  in  Brazil’s  successful  export 
growth of  the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The estimate of  supply of  noncoffee NRB exports also shows good 
statistical  results, though  not  as good as for manufactures.  Since the 
changes in relative dollar prices of  NRB goods are very important  in 
determining their growth, and since those changes are very well corre- 
lated with the movement of  wholesale prices in the United States, we 
substituted an index of  dollar prices of  Brazilian exports for the latter 
index, both in the deflation of the dollar amounts of  exports and in the 
computation of  the real exchange rate received by exporters. 
As can be seen, the estimated price elasticity in equation (iii) is about 
0.26, much lower than the corresponding estimates for manufactures. 
The estimated coefficient is different from zero at 5 percent (one-tail). 
The elasticity of  world imports in constant dollars is 0.75, indicating that, 
as in the case of manufactures, that variable is important in explaining the 
growth of NRB exports, though less important than in the former case. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of  real GDP does not appear signifi- 
cantly different from zero in any of  the three models. Again, this is 
probably due to its collinearity with the world imports variable, which 
indicates that the scaling role may be played by either of  the two. 
Summing up our findings regarding the estimates of supply functions of 
noncoffee exports: 
1. The real exchange rate received for exports is estimated to have 
played an important role in fostering the growth of exports of manufac- 
tures. Based on the model estimates, we would tend to place the price 
elasticity of  supply of  those goods near unity. 
2.  For NRB exports, the supply appears quite inelastic, confirming, in 
a sense, the expectations of  policymakers in the fifties. However, though 
low (about 0.25), the elasticity is significantly different from zero, show- 157  Brazilian Export Growth: Estimating the Supply Response, 1955-74 
ing that a devaluation would still have had a positive effect on NRB 
exports. We note that export quotas and other restrictions  placed on 
exports of NRB goods over the period of this analysis may account for the 
low value of  the elasticity. 
3. Another variable that appears to have been important in explaining 
the growth of  Brazilian exports is the level of world trade, defined as the 
volume of  imports in real terms of several leading developed countries. 
This variable seems particularly important in explaining the success of the 
export promotion strategy in recent periods, especially with regard to 
manufactures.  However, owing to the high  correlation  between  that 
variable and the Brazilian real GDP, we cannot completely separate the 
effects of the two variables. Hence the importance of  the growth in world 
trade may have been overestimated in the equations. 
Notes 
1. Undoubtedly some manufactured exports, such as orange juice and packed meat, can 
be regarded as NRB. However, since they receive the same incentives as the others we 
decided to treat them as manufactures, which greatly simplified the computations. 
2. Because of their depth, three studies are of particular interest: Tyler (1976), Supplicy 
(1976), and Doellinger et al. (1971). All three models were estimated with quarterly data, 
though Supplicy also worked with annual data for NRB goods. The Doellinger study covers 
the period 1963-68,  the estimates by Tyler refer to the period 1963-72, and the work by 
Supplicy is for 1964-1972  11. Supplicy also cites another study by Tyler where he estimates 
an export supply of  manufactures for 1961-70  (Tyler 1971). Generally the estimated price 
elasticity of  the export supply functions turned out positive and significantly different from 
zero. The  estimates yielded elasticities of  between 0.9 and 1.4  for manufactures and of about 
0.5 for noncoffee  NRB exports. For a fuller analysis see Carvalho and Haddad (1978, 
chap. 4). 
3. It is clear that considerations of  risk would imply that the importers would be willing to 
pay a price for diversification of  their supply sources. 
4. Note that the index of  fiscal incentives in the equation is defined by its inverse, which 
explains the negative sign of the coefficient. This index is in fact (1 -  S) where Sis  the subsidy 
rate given to manufacturing exports. 
5.  The risk of not receiving from the local state the ICM credits awarded to exports of 
manufactures could also explain this low elasticity with respect to the fiscal incentives. 
6. The simple correlation coefficient between the logs of the two variables is equal to .99. 
Therefore collinearity is certainly present in the estimates of  the coefficients of  the two 
variables. 
7.  Significantly different from zero at 10 percent, one tail, in equation (ii). 
8. Additional estimates of supply functions are presented in Carvalho and Haddad (1978 
chap. 4). 158  Jose L. Carvalho/Claudio L. S. Haddad 
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